Braver Men Walk Away Page 23

  As the years go by, that knowledge grows, and though deep down the fear never fades, the degree of fear changes according to circumstance and experience, until the time comes when, if you’re frightened, you are very, very frightened because you know you have every reason to be.

  I never felt fear when I was young; in a sense, it had to be acquired, like experience, over the years. When you’re young you think you’re immortal; later though, in Belfast and London, I realized I was wrong.

  Understanding did not come overnight; it emerged from the slow erosion of youthful certainties. It came little by little with every job and, particularly, it came with the hours spent between tasks, when fear can suddenly begin to throb, when it can threaten to burst forth and drown you in a freezing terror. That’s when you have to remind yourself of all the things you’ve learned, the things you’ve achieved. That’s when you have to exert mastery over fear by reassuring yourself that yes, you know enough to go out there and deal with the unknown.

  To outsiders, of course, it’s all inexplicable, because there is no commonality of experience, no shared understanding of what the bomb man’s work entails. People sometimes ask me: ‘How many real bombs have you done, then?’ and I’ve said, ‘A few hundred’; and they’ve said, ‘Oh’, as if disappointed. They don’t know about the thousands of false alarms, hoaxes and suspect devices which have had to be dealt with; the boxes and the parcels which only proved innocent after they’d tested every last resource, mental as well as physical.

  So the answer to the question is yes, I’ve been afraid. I’ve been afraid because a bomb is a deadly thing. If you’re not frightened of it then you won’t respect it and if you don’t respect it then you don’t get to live very long. It’s a fear that has to be mastered every time you begin the long walk towards something which might explode. You say to yourself, At this point it could injure me … at this point it might kill me … and at this point it doesn’t matter what I think or hope because now I’m as close as I’ll ever be, and if I’ve arrived at the precise moment when a timer initiates detonation …

  Luck, skill, knowledge, experience, fear, and strength of will – you need all of them in their correct proportion, and if the day comes when you’re convinced they’re out of balance, that your luck is running out or your knowledge is inadequate or the fear has grown too strong to be mastered, then that is the day you should stop and say, That’s enough.

  There’s no shame in ending a career by acknowledging that you cannot go on. All human beings are different, and no two bomb men are ever the same.

  It’s hard, very, very hard, but I’ve seen it happen to others, and I’ve understood why. It hasn’t diminished them as people and in some ways it has actually enriched them because it takes true courage to face reality and acknowledge that you can no longer contemplate the long walk to the loneliest place in the world.

  Only the foolhardy persist in continuing. Braver men walk away.

  Epilogue

  And so it continues: the bombing of New York’s World Trade Center, the devastation of the City of London, the slaughter of children in a northern English town … Despite the revulsion felt by all decent men and women and the efforts of law enforcement agencies worldwide, international terrorism still practises its lethal trade.

  In Britain, the IRA’s tactical mix of ‘potboilers’, ‘spectaculars’ and hoaxes has made for headlines on a scale not seen since the mid eighties, for whether a small device (the potboiler, so called because it keeps the threat bubbling away in the public’s mind) or a large explosion, the impact has been considerable.

  The killing of two youngsters in the crowded town centre of Warrington, Cheshire (the charge was probably no more than 1 pound) earned the IRA international condemnation; it also triggered a renewed peace effort on both sides of the Irish border. But only time will tell if the latest outburst of popular opinion has any more effect today than it did in the mid 1970s. Even the fact that the IRA appeared to switch tactics after Warrington – from soft civilian targets to high-profile attacks designed to cause commercial chaos – cannot be taken as evidence of a change of heart, for to assume that any terrorist group has a ‘heart’ smacks of a dangerous naivety.

  I doubt very much if the IRA will, as some have suggested, ‘learn a lesson’ from Warrington. After all, no long-term change occurred in the wake of the Harrods attack or the Enniskillen Remembrance Day slaughter: the bombers simply waited until the fuss died down and then went back to killing as and when it suited. Warrington might be 1993’s byword for the depths to which the IRA will stoop, but there’s no guarantee that the name of another town or city won’t take its place in the future.

  In terrorist terms, Warrington succeeded (because it terrorized). In propaganda terms, however, the City of London attack probably achieved far more, demonstrating as it did the IRA’s capacity to deal a major blow to the nerve centre of the UK’s financial community. Results also lived up to the IRA’s notion of ‘economic warfare’, for the reputed £350 million and £500 million it cost to clear up after the Baltic Exchange and Bishopsgate bombs respectively might be seen by the average citizen as money which could well have gone into building new hospitals or schools. And when people think that millions are being ‘lost’ because of terrorism, public frustration grows ever more acute – precisely as the terrorists intended. Spectacular bombings touch everyone, because ultimately it’s the ordinary householder who has to foot the bill by way of increased insurance premiums, or higher taxation.

  The Bishopsgate bomb, housed in a large tipper truck, serves to highlight some of the many difficulties facing a bomb-disposal man, for in such a situation he must (a) try to estimate the possible size of the device so that he can calculate the potentially enormous evacuation area required; (b) legislate for other blast effects which may not be immediately obvious (ruptured gas mains, for instance, and even – in this instance – damage to the London Underground); (c) contend with the almost Herculean task of locating the bomb’s fuzing system (about the size of two cigarette packets, and likely to be hidden anywhere).

  He must also bear in mind that there may be more than one fuzing system – and booby traps, too. Which means that even if he manages to get into the cab of the suspect vehicle and find a fuzing system and deal with it, he certainly can’t rule out the possibility of a second system elsewhere in the vehicle, discovery of which will only be possible by dint of removing the entire contents of the truck, anything up to four tons of explosive. (Nevertheless, it is not impossible to defuze very large bombs such as these, as has been shown in the past.)

  Prevention is, as ever, better than cure, which explains why, in response to these IRA spectaculars, mainland Britain seems ready to follow the Northern Ireland example by committing a heavy security presence to the streets. To stop the large van and truck bombs, police have initiated stop and search procedures, and even placed armed roadblocks on some of London’s and Manchester’s thoroughfares. But although such measures are undoubtedly effective, they’re extremely costly in terms of police resources, as well as a new and intrusive addition to our day-to-day existence. Unfortunately, though of necessity, they are forced to play the game the terrorists’ way, for the IRA’s campaign is as much designed to hit the public purse as disrupt the workings of a democratic society.

  Where potboilers are concerned, terrorism in its most literal sense is the objective. From a bomb-disposal man’s point of view, such a small device is seldom difficult to defuze – it’s finding them that is the greatest problem. Often, nothing more than a vague, general warning is given (for example, a bomb is in such-and-such a shopping precinct). Warnings are also deliberately issued late, in the hope that the bomb won’t be found whilst simultaneously ensuring that the IRA can still stake spurious claim to some kind of moral ground by saying, after the ambulances have departed, well, we were decent enough to tell you.

  There is a third kind of tactic in the IRA’s strategy: proxy bombing, where the driver
of a vehicle is forced to deliver a bomb to a specified target. Fortunately, this tactic is likely to remain unusual in mainland Britain, even though the practice has been followed in Northern Ireland for many years. That it is more prevalent in the latter than the former is due to the comparative strength of the IRA: in Northern Ireland, terrorists have the resources to hold hostage the family of a hijacked person because IRA collaborators and sympathizers exist in far greater number than on the British mainland.

  Outrage follows outrage … and as we approach the millennium there must be many who wonder what kind of world we’re now living in. In Britain the thought occurs in the wake of every terrorist attack, its despair given voice by yet another grieving mother, yet another heartbroken husband or wife. What terrorism truly is, and what terrorism truly does, is fully comprehended by a nation which for over twenty years has been sickened by the men (and women) of violence.

  By contrast, many a similarly law-abiding citizen of the USA has remained remote from the bomber’s threat – indeed, plenty of evidence exists to suggest that some have freely contributed to the terrorist cause, have so misunderstood the evil of the IRA that their dollars have, well-nigh literally, fuelled the flames.

  But then came the explosion at the World Trade Center. In a sense it paralleled the City of London attacks, although in New York the much smaller bomb was actually placed inside the building rather than out on the street. It caused considerably more structural damage than if it had exploded outdoors; that the building so well withstood the huge blast says much for the basic strength of its construction.

  In another sense though, the New York attack represents far more than a mere echo of that for so long experienced on the other side of the Atlantic. For in demonstrating that terrorism can indeed strike at the heart of any community, in any civilized society and at any time, the World Trade Center bombing will hopefully have driven home the message that as long as terrorism is allowed to flourish, whether by tacit consent or active support, then everyone in this global village of ours – children and adults alike – is at risk.

  Wider awareness is for the ultimate good of all, for only with a common understanding and a shared determination can society ensure that one door after another is closed to the killers in our midst, leaving them with nowhere to hide, and nowhere to run.

  Glossary

  AE

  Ammunition Examiner (later changed to AT)

  AT

  Ammunition Technician

  ATO

  Ammunition Technical Officer

  BAD

  Base Ammunition Depot

  BAOR

  British Army of the Rhine

  BEA

  British European Airways

  a ‘Blind’

  A projectile filled with high explosive, smoke or illuminating composition which has failed to function on impact or arrival at its target

  BOAC

  British Overseas Airways Corporation

  C4

  An American-manufactured military plastic explosive

  CAD

  Central Ammunition Depot

  CMD

  Conventional Munition Disposal

  Co-Op

  A ‘home-made’ high explosive

  Cordite

  A type of propellant for guns, rockets etc.

  Cordtex

  The proprietary name for a type of detonating cord

  CSM

  Company Sergeant Major

  CRAOC

  Commander Royal Army Ordnance Corps

  Detonating cord

  A flexible cord containing high explosive which is used to transmit a detonating wave. The cord cannot be ignited, it must be set off by detonation

  Detonator

  A small device used to initiate detonation

  Disrupter

  A piece of equipment which fires a jet of water at high speed to ‘disrupt’ an IED

  EOD

  Explosive Ordnance Disposal (a generic term covering both CMD and IEDD)

  Expo

  Explosives Officer

  Frangex

  A commercial nitroglycerine-based high explosive

  Fuze

  A mechanical, chemical or electrical mechanism which starts the firing process of an explosive charge

  Gelamex

  A commercial nitroglycerine-based high explosive

  HE

  High explosive

  IED (D)

  Improvized Explosive Device (Disposal)

  Incendiary

  A bomb designed to cause a fire

  IRA

  Irish Republican Army

  Mercury-tilt switch

  A type of electrical switch containing mercury. When the switch is moved, the mercury completes the circuit and triggers an IED

  Microswitch

  A small electrical switch which is extremely sensitive to pressure

  MO

  Medical Officer

  Mortar

  A short-barrelled weapon which is used to launch low-velocity projectiles at high angles

  Mortar bomb

  A bomb fired from a mortar

  MVEE

  Military Vehicles Experimental Establishment

  NAAFI

  Navy, Army, Air Force Institute

  NCO

  Non-commissioned officer

  NG

  Nitroglycerine

  PE4

  A British military plastic explosive

  PETN

  A commercial and military high explosive

  RAOC

  Royal Army Ordnance Corps

  RDX

  A commercial and military high explosive

  RE

  Royal Engineers

  RSM

  Regimental Sergeant Major

  RUC

  Royal Ulster Constabulary

  Safety fuse

  A cord containing gunpowder which is used to transmit a flame. It can be ignited by a naked flame

  Semtex

  A plastic explosive manufactured in Czechoslovakia

  Sexpo

  Senior Explosives Officer

  Sten gun

  A World War II sub-machine gun

  Thyrister

  An electronic component

  TNT

  A high explosive

  WO 1

  Warrant Officer Class 1

  WO 2

  Warrant Officer Class 2

  WRVS

  Women’s Royal Voluntary Service

  Index

  The page numbers in this index relate to the printed version of this book; they do not match the pages of your ebook. You can use your ebook reader’s search tool to find a specific word or passage.

  Abingdon, RAF, 100–3

  Air Mail bomb parcels, 98–9

  airline security, 185–6

  airport depressurization chamber tests, 99–100, 184

  Aldershot, 28–30

  Ammunition Examiner’s job, requirements of, 29

  Ammunition Inspection and Disposal Unit (AIDU) Hounslow, No. 1, 86–9, 94

  Ammunition Inspectorate, 84, 103

  Ammunition Repair Methods Development Unit, Bramley, 55, 85

  Anderson, Martina, IRA terrorist, 173, 175

  Angry Brigade, 94, 128

  Anti-Terrorist Branch of the Metropolitan Police, 133, 181, 200

  Army Apprentice College, Chepstow, 83

  Army Catering Corps, 113

  Army life, 29–55

  Austin Reed, IRA incendiary device at, 147

  Austrian Airlines jet, bomb attack on, 98

  Bad Oeynhausen, 37, 82

  Badajos barracks, 31–2

  Baker Street Underground Station bomb, 148–50

  Balcombe Street siege, 167–9

  Baltic Exchange, City of London bomb, 213–14

  Batey, John Francis, 169

  Belfast, 65, 103, 104–127, 170

  explosions statistics, 104–5

  IRA incendiary attacks in, 169

&
nbsp; Benghazi, Cyrenaica, 65, 69–70

  Berlin, 42–51

  Biddle, Geoffrey, 64–5, 128–9, 141–4

  Bin, Sam, 37–40, 55, 82

  Bishop Wordsworth’s School, Salisbury, 17, 24

  Black September, 94, 128

  ‘Blacker Bombard’, the, 20

  bomb(s) (see also incendiary devices),

  Austrian Airlines jet, 98

  Baker Street Underground, 148–50

  Baltic Exchange, City of London, 213–14

  Brighton, Grand Hotel, 3, 171–3, 175

  British Forces’ Broadcasting Service car, 144–6

  car, 104, 106–12, 139, 140–7, 165, 214

  Data Centres, international network of, 130–1

  Debenhams, 192–201

  disposal equipment, 91, 132–3

  Downing Street, 1–8, 130, 191

  El Al, attempted, 176–85

  Gieves & Hawkes, 132–3

  Great Scotland Yard, 146

  Greek Embassy, 88, 91–4

  Hammersmith Broadway suspect, 136–7

  Harrods, 210–12, 214

  hoaxes, 84, 100, 105, 150, 157, 213, 218

  Kensington Church Street, 153–6, 164, 169